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Article 2

By Steven L. Willborn*

A Time for Change: A Critical
Analysis of the Nebraska

Administrative Procedure Act
The Nebraska Administrative Procedure Act' is like an ever expanding patchwork quilt. The center was sewn in 1945 from fabric
provided by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 2 Since then, patches of varying dimensions and
colors have been added by no less than twenty-five separate legislative bills, 3 and yet there is no indication that the quilt is near
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. BA,
Northland College, 1974, M.S., J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1976.
1. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -919 (Reissue 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as "the Act" or "Nebraska APA"].
2. The Nebraska APA as originally enacted was based on the 1946 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act that was prepared by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Compare Administrative Procedure Act, Ch.255, 1945 Neb. Laws 794 with MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE Act §§ 1, 3-4, reprintedin NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION*

ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF

COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
CONFERENCE 191, 202-07 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 1946 MODEL ACT]. See
Gretna Pub. School Dist. No. 37 v. State Bd. of Educ., 201 Neb. 769, 771-72, 272
N.W.2d 268, 269 (1978). Although the 1946 Model Act was not formally approved until 1946, it was prepared and widely distributed to members of state
administrative commissions, to bar associations, and to other interested
groups and persons in 1943 and 1944. 13 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 401 (Cum.
Supp. 1980). See also Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, reprinted in
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws & PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE 230-45 (1943).

Thus, al-

though pre-dating it, the Nebraska APA was based on the 1946 Model Act.
See 13 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 405 (Cum. Supp. 1980); Merrill, Oklahoma's
New AdministrativeProcedureAct, 17 OKLA. L REV. 1, 2 n.3 (1964).
3. Ch. 350, 1947 Neb. Laws 1097; Ch. 342, 1951 Neb. Laws 1128; Ch. 359, 1953 Neb.
Laws 1137; Ch. 456, 1959 Neb. Laws 1510; Ch.531, 1963 Neb. Laws 1664; Ch.618,
1967 Neb. Laws 2071; Ch. 837, 1969 Neb. Laws 3160; Ch.838, 1969 Neb. Laws
3161; L.B. 35, 1971 Neb. Laws; LB. 373, 1972 Neb. Laws 95; LB. 1284, 1972 Neb.
Laws 925, 938; L.B. 134, 1973 Neb. Laws 369; LB. 604, 1974 Neb. Laws 336; LB.
819, 1974 Neb. Laws 709, 714; LB. 267, 1975 Neb. Laws 512; LB. 316, 1975 Neb.
Laws 639; L.B. 615, 1976 Neb. Laws 285; LB. 462, 1977 Neb. Laws 1087; LB. 44,
1978 Neb. Laws 64; LB. 585, 1978 Neb. Laws 394, LB. 137, 1979 Neb. Laws 404;
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completion. 4 The center cannot hold.5 The seamstress should begin anew.
This article is a critical analysis of the Nebraska APA. The
analysis demonstrates that the Act has been rendered obsolete.
This obsolescence is not accounted for solely by tho existence of
legislative indecision or by the legislature's ill-advised decisions
over the past thirty-six years, although those have certainly been
contributing factors. 6 In addition, Nebraska's administrative superstructure has greatly increased in size and complexity since
1945;7 there has been considerable experience at the state legislative level with administrative procedures; 8 and there has been a
veritable explosion of scholarly work in the area. 9 The time for
change is at hand. It is hoped that this article will not only provide

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

L.B. 208, 1979 Neb. Laws 741; L.B. 322, 1979 Neb. Laws 947, 995; L.B. 712, 1980
Neb. Laws 608; L.B. 846, 1980 Neb. Laws 855.
See Neb. L.R. 238, 88TH LEG., 1ST SEss., NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, at
23-24 (1980) (review of current rules and regulations of state administrative
agencies; organization of system in manner which is easily accessible); Neb.
L.R. 239, 88TH LEG., 1ST SESS., NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL,at 24-25 (1980)
(review of Nebraska APA).
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold ....
Yeats, The Second Coming, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1582 (1962).
Undoubtedly, a complete reworking of the Nebraska APA would merely
begin another "gyre" in the history of Nebraska administrative proceduresa gyre that will surely be marked by as much uncertainty and change as the
first. A new gyre is advocated in this article with the hope that, unlike Yeats'
pessimistic view of civilizations, administrative procedures can be improved
if the lessons of the past are noted and heeded.
See note 3 supra. See, e.g., notes 17-27, 80-84, 148-52, 164-81, 185-87 & accompanying text infra.
This growth is as much intuitively perceived as it is empirically demonstrable. Nevertheless, coverage in the NEBRASKA BLUE BOOK is an indication of
the growth; the description of administrative agencies that covered barely 40
pages in 1946 required over 200 pages in 1978. Compare NEBRASKA LEGISLAWrvE COUNCIL,1946 NEBRASKA BLUE BOOK 220-64 with NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL, 1978-1979 NEBRASKA BLUE BOOK 363-566.
See 13 UNIFoRM LAws ANNOTATED 399-532 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Bonfield, The
Iowa Administrative ProcedureAct: Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. REV.
731, 745-47 (1975).
See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 8, at 745 n.50; Cox, The Oklahoma Administrative ProceduresAct: Fifteen Years of Interpretation,31 OKLA. L. REV. 886
(1978); McCrory, Administrative Proceduresin Montana: A View After Four
Years with the Montana Administrative ProcedureAct, 38 MONT.L REV. 1
(1977). See generally REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATiVE PROCEDURE
ACT 1, 1 (1980) (unpublished draft submitted to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its 1980 meeting) (on file with the Nebraska Law Review) [hereinafter cited as 1980 PROPOSED ACT].
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the catalyst for that change, but will also provide guidance on the
nature of the necessary change; that is, it will attempt to gently
guide the seamstress' hand.
I.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEBRASKA APA 10

The Nebraska APA prescribes the minimum administrative
procedures required of all state agencies which are subject to the
Act. 1 This article first presents a discussion of the Act's coverage:
which agencies are, and which are not, subject to the Act's mandates? Second, the distinction between rules and contested cases
is examined: What is a rule? What is a contested case? How can
each be identified? Since different procedures are prescribed for
each, the distinction is crucial to an informed interpretation of the
Act. Finally, the four major areas covered by the Act are analyzed:
(1) rule-making procedures, including notice to the public of
agency rules; (2) contested case procedures; (3) legislative review
of agency rules; and (4) judicial review of agency rules and contested cases.
A.

Coverage

The coverage of the Nebraska APA is governed by section one
of the Act. That section provides a general definition for the term
"agency": "Agency shall mean each board, commission, department, officer, division, or other adminstrative office or unit of the
state government authorized by law to make rules ....-12 It then
specifically exempts certain entities. 13 This "general definition"
approach to coverage is commendable; it is better, for example,
than a "specific enumeration" provision which lists each agency
subject to the Act. 14 The paramount purpose of the Act is to impose a minimum uniform procedure on all, or almost all, state administrative agencies. 15 The "general definition" approach to
coverage better effectuates this purpose than the "specific enumeration" approach. It avoids the possibility that the legislature may
10. This article will focus on the Nebraska APA. It will not consider additional
administrative procedures that may be required of specific agencies by
statute or by agency rules or practices, nor will it discuss other
administrative law issues in Nebraska except, of course, to the extent they
may have an impact on the Nebraska APA.
11. NEB.REV. STAT. § 84-916 (Reissue 1976). See County of Blaine v. State Bd. of
Equalization & Assessment, 180 Neb. 471, 472, 143 N.W.2d 880, 882 (1966).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
13. The Adjutant General's office, the courts, including the Nebraska Workmen's
Compensation Court, the Court of Industrial Relations and the Legislature
are specifically excluded from the definition of "agency." Id.
14. F. COOPER, STATE AMnmxsTRATrvE LAw 104-05 (1965).
15. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
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inadvertently fail to list an agency that should be subject to the
Act, eliminates the need to amend the statutes to provide for coverage each time the legislature creates a new agency, and it may
result in coverage for state entities which under the "specific
enumeration" approach are not specifically listed, but which are
subordinate to agencies which are listed.16 Nevertheless, for several reasons the Nebraska APA's definition of "agency" is inadequate.
First, the "agency" definition contains a basic defect which is
peculiar to the Nebraska APA. The Nebraska APA's coverage is7
limited to agencies that are "authorized by law to make rules.'
The language of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-"authorized by law to make rules or determine contested
cases"' 8-is broader. 19 Therefore, in contrast to the Model Act,
and even though the Nebraska APA clearly has provisions intended to apply to contested cases, 20 if an agency is authorized to
21
determine contested cases, but not authorized to make rules,
16. F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 98-99; Bonfield, supra note 8, at 760-61. But see
note 35 & accompanying text infra.
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
18. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 1 (1), reprintedin NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS & PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFER-

(emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 1961 MODEL
ACT]. See also 1946 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 1(1), at 202 ("authorized by
law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases") (emphasis added).
19. A clarifying note on the model administrative procedure acts of the National
ENCE 199, 206 (1961)

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is perhaps necessary.
The Conference first adopted a model state administrative procedure act in
1946. 1946 MODEL ACT, supra note 2. It adopted a substantially revised model
state administrative procedure act in 1961. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 18.
Another revision has been proposed and a draft of the revision was read for
the first time at the Conference's 1980 annual meeting. 1980 PROPOSED ACT,

supra note 9. The distinction between "model" acts, such as the model administrative procedure acts referred to above, and "uniform" acts is explained by the commissioners as follows:
Where there is a demand for an Act covering the subject matter in a
substantial number of the states, but where in the judgment of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws it is
not a subject upon which uniformity between the states is necessary
or desirable, but where it would be helpful to have legislation which

would tend toward uniformity where enacted, Acts on such subjects
are promulgated as Model Acts.
1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 18, at 206. The model acts have considerable
influence on states adopting administrative procedure acts. See 13 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 399, 405-12 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
20. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-913 to -915 (Reissue 1976).
21. For an example of such an agency, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 43-45
(1932). See also Tushnet, Invitation to a Wedding: Some Thoughts on Article
III and a Problemof Statutory Interpretation,60 IOWA L REV. 937, 951 (1975).
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that agency is not subject to the Nebraska APA's contested case or
judicial review procedures.
This defect was probably the result of legislative oversight. The
Nebraska APA as initially enacted in 1945 imposed only rulemaking requirements. 22 Although based on the 1946 Model Act,2
which provided procedures for contested cases, the Nebraska APA
contained no such procedures. Consequently, the definition of
"agency" in the 1945 Nebraska APA was narrowed from the Model
Act language to encompass only those agencies "authorized by law
to make rules. ' 24 Contested case procedures were added to the
Nebraska APA in 1959.25 However, the legislature failed to correspondingly expand the definition of "agency" 26 and, as a result,
Ne27
braska is left with the anomalous situation described above.
Ironically, the solution to this coverage problem may not be to
expand the Nebraska definition to include the 1961 Model Act language of "or determine contested cases," 28 but rather to omit the
phrase entirely. The 1980 Proposed Act recommends omitting the
requirement that the agency be "authorized by law to make rules
or to determine contested cases" so that the coverage of the state
administrative procedure act is extended to as many state governmental units as possible. 29 Such an omission would expand the
Act's coverage to include (1) agencies that affect private rights
through means other than making rules or determining contested
cases, e.g., through informal action or investigations, and (2) agencies that are not authorized by law to make 30
rules or determine contested cases, but attempt to do so anyway.
The Nebraska APA definition of "agency" can also be criticized
for its specific exclusions. As noted before, the definition specifically excludes "the Adjutant General's office... ,the courts, including the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, the Court
of Industrial Relations, and the Legislature."3 1 Admittedly, there
are fewer exclusions in the Nebraska APA than there are in the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Administrative Procedure Act, Ch. 255, 1945 Neb. Laws 794.
See note 2 supra.
Administrative Procedure Act, Ch. 255, § 1(1), 1975 Neb. Laws 794.
Ch. 456, §§ 1, 6-8, 1959 Neb. Laws 1510.
Ch. 456, § 1, 1959 Neb. Laws 1510.
See notes 20-21 & accompanying text supra.
Compare NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-901(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) with 1961 MODEL
ACT, supra note 18, at 206.
29. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 9, 12.
30. See Bonfield, supra note 8, at 761-62. Nebraska APA coverage of agencies in
the latter category would ensure the availability of judicial review under the
judicial review provisions of the Act. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-917 to -918
(Reissue 1976). See also notes 185-87 & accompanying text infra.
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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administrative procedure acts of some other states; 32 nevertheless,
there may be too many.
The exclusion of the courts and the legislature is appropriate
for obvious reasons. 33 However, the exclusion of the Adjutant
General's office, the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court
and the Court of Industrial Relations is less appropriate. As stated
by one commentator:
[If one agency succeeds in having itself entirely excluded by name from
[an administrative procedure act,] the scramble is on for all other agencies to seek such exemptions as well.... Many states wisely exempt no
agencies from their act. Many states, however, list a host of named agencies that are entirely exempt from their act. One wonders what, aside
from raw political clout, dictated the exemption in states A-D of certain
agencies that were not exempted in states E-I, especially when those
agencies in states
3 4 E-I do operate successfully under their administrative
procedure acts.

A third shortcoming of the Nebraska APA's definition of
"agency" is that it fails to explicitly specify coverage where a
subordinate division of a covered agency makes rules or determines contested cases. 35 The 1980 Proposed Act resolves this issue
by adding the following sentence to its definition of agency: "To
the extent it purports to exercise authority subject to any provision of this Act, an administrative unit otherwise qualifying as an
'agency' shall be treated as a separate agency even
if the unit is
36
located within or subordinate to another agency."
The Nebraska Supreme Court has construed the Nebraska
37
APA's arguably flawed definition of "agency" in several cases.
32. See, e.g., GA. CODE §3A-102(a) (1974); OKLA. STAT. tit. 75, §301(1)(a)-(g)
(1976). See also Feuld, The Georgia Uniform Administrative ProcedureAct, 1
GA. ST. B. J. 269, 270-83 (1965); Cox, supra note 9, at 887-89.
33. See Bonfield, supra note 8, at 763-64.
34. Bonfield, supra note 8, at 767-68 (footnotes omitted). See also Hazard, The
Oregon Adminstrative ProcedureAct: Status and Prospects, 39 OR. L. REV.
97, 101 (1960).
35. See Bonfield, supra note 8, at 768-69.
36. 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 9.
37. Richardson v. Board of Educ., 206 Neb. 18, 25,290 N.W.2d 803, 808 (1980) (State
Board of Education is an "agency" under the Nebraska APA); J K & J, Inc. v.
Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 194 Neb. 413,417,231 N.W.2d 694, 697 (1975)
(Nebraska Liquor Control Commission is an "agency" under the Nebraska
APA); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 785,
199 N.W.2d 752, 760 (1972) (Court of Industrial Relations is an "agency" under
the Nebraska APA) (Court of Industrial Relations was later specifically exempted by statute, L.B. 819, § 1(3), 1974 Neb. Laws 709, 710); Harnett v. City of
Omaha, 188 Neb. 449, 451, 197 N.W.2d 375, 377 (1972) (city personnel board is
not an "agency" under the Nebraska APA); County of Gage v. State Bd. of
Equalization & Assessment, 185 Neb. 749, 752, 178 N.W.2d 759, 762 (1970) (State
Board of Equalization & Assessment is an "agency" under the Nebraska
APA); The Flamingo, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 185 Neb. 22,
24, 173 N.W.2d 369. 371 (1969) (Nebraska Liquor Control Commission is an

1981]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

However, it has never been confronted with coverage issues with
respect to two entities: (1) constitutional agencies such as the
Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, and (2) political
subdivisions such as local school districts. In both situations, coverage issues are difficult and important.
A plain reading of the Nebraska APA's definition of agency indicates-that the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, 38 as
well as other constitutional agencies, is within the Act's coverage. 39
The Board is an administrative office or unit of the state government, it is authorized by law to make riles, 40 and it is not specifically exempted from the Act's coverage.4 1 That conclusion is
supported by Cataniav. University of Nebraska,42 a 1979 Nebraska
Supreme Court case. In Catania, the plaintiff brought a negligence action against the University. The Nebraska Supreme Court
held that the University was a state agency for purposes of the Tort
Claims Act, which provides for a partial waiver of the sovereign
immunity defense when claims are brought against the state or
state agencies.4 3 Since the Tort Claims Act contains a definition of
agency that is slightly different from the Nebraska APA definition
of that term, Catania does not conclusively determine that the
Board of Regents is an agency for purposes of the Nebraska APAA4
agency under the Nebraska APA); Yellow Cab Co. v. Nebraska State Ry.
Comm'n, 175 Neb. 150, 155-56, 120 N.W.2d 922, 926 (1963) (State Railway Commission is an "agency" under the Nebraska APA).
38. The original source of the Board of Regents' authority is the Constitution of
Nebraska. NEB. CONST. art. 7, § 10.
39. The other constitutional agencies are the Board of Parole, NEB. CONST. art. 4,
§ 13; the Nebraska Public Service Commission, id. § 20; the Board of Educational Lands and Funds, id. art. 7, § 6; the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska
State Colleges, id. § 13; and the State Department of Education, id. §§ 2A Of
these agencies, the Nebraska Public Service Commission, the Board of Educational Lands and Funds, and the State Department of Education have filed
rules with the Revisor of Regulations pursuant to the Nebraska APA. Therefore, they appear to consider themselves covered by the Act. The Board of
Pardons, the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges and the Board
of Regents of the University of Nebraska have not filed rules with the Revisor
of Regulations and, hence, appear to consider themselves outside the coverage of the Act. Although the textual discussion is limited to the Board of
Regents of the University of Nebraska, the reasoning should be applicable to
the other constitutional agencies.
40. See generally NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 85-105 to -106 (Reissue 1976 & Cur. Supp.
1980).

41.
42.
43.
44.

See note 13 supra.
204 Neb. 304, 282 N.W.2d 27 (1979).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,209 to -8,239 (Reissue 1976).
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,210(1) (Reissue 1976) with NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 84-901(1) (Reissue 1976). See also Comment, Idaho AdministrativeAgencies and the New Idaho Administrative ProcedureAct, 3 IDAHO L. REV. 61,65
(1966).
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Nevertheless, a plain reading of the definition of agency in the Nepersuasive, albraska APA and the Catania holding provides
46
45
though not apodictic, support for coverage.
As in the case of the Board of Regents, Nebraska APA coverage
of political subdivisions such as local school districts or natural resources districts is also unresolved. The resolution depends on the
interpretation of the word "state" in the Nebraska APA's definition
of agency. If the word is construed to require statewide jurisdiction, obviously the Act does not apply to political subdivisions. If,
however, the word is construed to require only financial dependence on the state or power derived from the state, the Act could
apply to political subdivisions. The former is the more desirable
interpretation. 47 Although a standardized administrative procedure for political subdivisions may be useful,4 a separate statute
45. Other jurisdictions are split on the issue. Compare In re Rhode Island Bar
Ass'n, 118 R.I. 489, 491, 374 A.2d 802, 803 (1977) (agency is governmental entity
created by "statute, executive order, or the Constitution") (emphasis added)
(dicta) and State Bd. of Regents v. Gray, 561 S.W.2d 140, 142-43 (Tenn. 1978)
(Board of Regents is an agency under state's administrative procedure act)
with Sholes v. University of Minn., 236 Minn. 452, 456, 54 N.W.2d 122, 125-26
(1952) (Board of Regents is not an agency under state's administrative procedure act) and Fort Sumner Mun. School Bd. v. Parsons, 82 N.M. 610, 616, 485
P.2d 366, 372 (1971) (Sutin, J., concurring) (constitutional agency is not an
agency under state's administrative procedure act).
46. The Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska could argue that Board of
Regents v. Exon, 199 Neb. 146, 256 N.W.2d 330 (1977), precludes coverage.
Generally, Exon limited the extent to which the legislature could infringe on
the Board's constitutional authority to govern the University of Nebraska.
The Board could argue that if the Nebraska APA is construed to cover the
Board, it exceeds the limits Exon placed on the legislature. The Nebraska
APA, however, is distinguishable from the statutes considered by the court in
Exon. It does not prescribe substantive powers and duties and, hence, does
not affect the Board's discretion or authority (except in the very limited
sense of imposing a duty to follow certain procedures in making rules and
adjudicating contested cases). See id. at 149, 256 N.W.2d at 353. In addition,
the Nebraska APA does not delegate the Board's authority. See id. at 152-53,
256 N.W.2d at 335. But see NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-908 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (rules
not effective untl approved by the Governor); id. at § 84-908.01 to .05 (legislative committee has power to suspend the rules and legislature has power to
repeal rules). Rather, the crux of the Nebraska APA is procedural; it
prescribes procedures without limiting or expanding the Board's powers. Cf.,
University Police Officers Union v. University of Neb., 203 Neb. 4, 10-11, 277
N.W.2d 529, 534 (1979) (court holds that certain statutes governing the University of Nebraska do not conflict with Exon).
47. Predictably enough, it is also the majority view. See, e.g., Karrick v. Board of
Educ., 174 Ohio St. 467, 468-69, 190 N.E.2d 256, 257 (1963); Riggins v. Housing
Auth., 87 Wash. 2d 98, 99-100, 549 P.2d 480, 481-82 (1976). See also Comment,
supra note 44, at 67-68 nn.65-68 & cases cited therein. But see Witgenstein v.
School Bd., 347 So.2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
48. For example, an administrative procedure act for political subdivisions could
simplify the often complicated process of judicial review. See Bloomenthal,
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is necessary because of the differences
between state-wide agen49
cies and political subdivisions.
B.

Rules and Contested Cases: Definitional Issues

The definitions of "rule" and "contested case" are crucial to an
informed interpretation of the Nebraska APA. The procedures
prescribed by the Act for the promulgation of rules are different
50
than those established for the adjudication of contested cases.
Rules, but not contested cases, are subject to review and revocation by the Legislature's Committee on Administrative Agency
Rules and Regulations. 5 ' In addition, there are separate and distinct judicial review provisions provided for rules and contested
cases. 52 Despite its importance, the distinction between rules and
contested cases (which is merely a particularized manifestation of
and adjudication) is particuthe distinction between legislation
53
larly muddy in Nebraska.
Like most such definitions in state administrative procedure
acts,M the Nebraska APA's definition of rule contains both inclusionary clauses and exclusionary clauses. The Act's inclusionary
clauses are as follows: "Rule shall mean [1] any rule, regulation,
or standard issued by an agency, including the amendment or repeal thereof... and [2] designed to implement, interpret, or make
specific the law enforced or administered by it or [3] governing its

organization or procedure

.

. .

. 55

This language requires an

agency action to meet clause one and either clause two or clause
three to fall within the definition. The language contains most of
the elements which should be included in the definition: it is
broadly inclusive,5 6 it covers interpretative5 7 as well as substantive

49.
50.

51.
52.

53.

54.
55.
56.

The Revised Model State Administrative ProcedureAct-Reform or Retrogression, 1963 DuKE L.J. 593, 602.
See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 12.
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-902 to -906, 84-906.05 to -907.01, 84-908 to -908.01,
84-909 to -912 (Reissue 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980) with NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-913
to -915, 84-917 to -919 (Reissue 1976).
See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-908.01 to .05 (Cum- Supp. 1980). See also notes 15363 & accompanying text infra.
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-911 to -912 (Reissue 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980)
with NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-917 to -919 (Reissue 1976). See also notes 189-202 &
accompanying text infra.
Compare,e.g., Kelly v. John, 162 Neb. 319,75 N.W.2d 713 (1956) (rezoning ordinance with right of appeal was an administrative matter) with Scottsbluff Improvement Ass'n v. City of Scottsbluff 183 Neb. 722, 164 N.W.2d 215 (1969)
(rezoning ordinance was a legislative matter).
See F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 107-19.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (numbers added).
F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 108. Despite the apparent broadness of the definition, some agencies may attempt to escape it by issuing manuals, memos
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rules, 5 8 it encompasses procedural and organizational matters, 59
and it includes amendments and repeals of rules. 60 Nevertheless,
there are shortcomings. An obvious shortcoming of the definition
is its circularity -"Rule shall mean any rule .... 61 Perhaps
more significantly, the current 62 inclusionary clauses do not contain either of the two accepted factors that distinguish rules from
contested cases: general applicability 63 and future effect. 64 Ironi-

57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.

63.

and the like, instead of rules, regulations or standards. See id.; Bonfield,
supra note 8, at 827. If this is a problem in Nebraska, the definition could
easily be broadened further to encompass the manuals and memos. See 1980
PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 11-12; Bonfield, supra note 8, at 827.
For a definition of interpretative rules, see 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9,
at 10.
F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 108. The Nebraska definition covers agency
statements designed to interpret the law. While this coverage in the Nebraska APA's definition of "rule" is appropriate, it may be desirable to exempt interpretative rules from the advanced notice and public participation
requirements for other types of rules. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9,
at 43-44.
F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 109.
Id.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Bonfield, supra note 8, at
827.
Until 1959, the Nebraska APA's definition of rule contained the "general applicability" distinction. See note 63 infra. As initially enacted in 1945, the
definition read: "'Rule' means the written statement of any rule, regulation,
standard or policy of general application,issued by an agency ... and
designed to implement, interpret or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or governing its organization or procedure .... Administrative Procedure Act, Ch.255, 1945 Neb. Laws 794 (emphasis added). In 1947,
the legislature added the following proviso to the definition: "Provided, that
for the purpose of this act every rule which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
" Ch.
O. 350, 1947 Neb. Laws 1097,
presumed to have general applicability .
1098. Thus, a rule that prescribed a penalty was presumed to have general
applicability and, as a result, fell within the inclusionary clause of the 1945
Act.
In 1959, however, the legislature omitted the "of general application"
clause from the 1945 definition, Ch.456,1959 Neb. Laws 1510, leaving the inclusionary clause substantially in its cnrent form. See note 55 & accompanying
text supra. This amendment not only resulted in an overly inclusive definition, see notes 65-67 & accompanying text infra, but it undercut the "general
applicability" reference in the 1947 proviso to the definition. That proviso,
and the essentially meaningless "general applicability" reference, is in the
current Nebraska APA definition of "rule." NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1980).
That is, rules are addressed to indicated, but unnamed and unspecified persons or situations and must be applied in a further proceeding before the
legal position of any particular individual will be definitely affected, while
contested cases operate concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity. See Schwartz, Administrative Terminology and the Administrative
ProcedureAct, 48 McH. L. REV. 57,67 (1949). See also American Airlines, Inc.
v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 636 (D.C. Cir.), (Burger, J., dissenting)
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966) ("Rulemaking is normally directed toward
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cally, 65 this renders the definition overly inclusive. Specifically,
the definition of "rule" may encompass "contested cases"' 66 and,
hence, fails to provide any guidance on a distinction that is both
to an enlightened interpretation of the Nebasic and essential
67
braska APA.

The Nebraska APA's definition of rule also contains exclusionary clauses: "Rule. . [does not includeJ regulations concerning
the internal management of the agency not affecting private rights,
private interests, or procedures available to the public ...

[or]

permits, certificates of public convenience and necessity,
franchises, rate orders, and rate tariffs, and any rules of interpretation thereof .... ",68 These exclusionary clauses are dated. While
the exclusion of, inter alia, internal management concerns 69 and
permits 70 are still justified, experience with administrative proce-

64.

65.
66.

67.

68.
69.

70.

the formulation of requirements having a general application to all members
of a broadly identifiable class"). The "general applicability" distinction is
widely utilized in administrative procedure acts. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT,
supra note 9, at 11; 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 18, at 207; 1946 MODEL ACT,
supra note 2, at 203; Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1976). See generally F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 108.
That is, a rule prescribes future patterns of conduct, while a contested case
determines liabilities on the basis of present or past facts. Schwartz, supra
note 63, at 67. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908);
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 32,
520 P.2d 29, 33, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 809 (1974); Stephens v. Unified School Dist.
No. 500, 218 Kan. 220, 233-34, 546 P.2d 197, 208-09 (1975). The "future effect"
distinction is also utilized in administrative procedure acts, usually in conjunction with the "general applicability" distinction. See 1946 MODEL ACT,
supra note 2, at 203; Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1976).
See note 56 supra.
That is, a contested case satisfies clause one because it sets forth rules or
standards to govern a particular set of facts and it satisfies clause two because, obviously, it "makes specific" the law enforced or administered by the
agency.
See notes 50-52 supra. It is probably unrealistic to expect the definitions of
"rule" and "contested case" to completely resolve the complex problem of
distinguishing between the two modes of agency action. See Hazard, supra
note 34, at 107-08. Undoubtedly, close cases will have to be resolved with reference to non-statutory as well as statutory standards and with an eye on the
practical consequences of the decision. See Bonfield, supra note 8, at 829.
Nevertheless, the Nebraska APA's definitions of the term are unacceptable.
Not only do they fail to provide guidance on the distinction, they are a hindrance to analysis that will result in a logical and policy-based differentiation.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
The "internal management" exclusion was based on the 1946 Model Act. 1946
MODEL ACT, supra note 2, at 203. See Ch. 255, 1945 Neb. Laws 794, 795. Despite its age and the fact that its language could be improved a bit, the exclusion is still justified. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 54, Bonfield,
supra note 8, at 833-34.
The "permits" exclusion was added after a federal court had determined that
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dure acts
has demonstrated the need for several additional exclu1
sions.

7

The Nebraska APA's definition of "contested case" is based, virtually verbatim, on the 1946 Model Act.72 It defines contested case
as "a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties,
or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing. '73 This defnition may require the formal procedures for a contested case 74 to
be utilized in situations where less formal procedures would be
more appropriate. For example, assume that the Nebraska APA
covers local school districts; 75 that a teacher has observed student
A tearing notices off of a bulletin board; and that the standard punishment for infractions of that nature is a one day suspension from
school. It is clear that student A has a "constitutional right" to
some kind of a hearing before the standard punishment can be imposed.76 The Constitution, however, does not require an overly
formalized hearing prior to suspending student A. Rather, student
A need only be given an oral notification of the charge and, if he
denies it, an explanation of the evidence and an opportunity to
present his side. 77 The Nebraska APA requires more. Since
student A is entitled to a hearing by "constitutional right," the formal procedures of the Act would be mandated even though the
Constitution (and common sense) require much less. This problem cannot be corrected by merely removing the "or constitutional
right" language from the definition; the phrase "required by law"
in the definition has been interpreted to include both statutory and

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.

rate-making, despite its apparent adjudicative nature, was rule-making. See
Ch. 342, 1951 Neb. Laws 1128; Mogis v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 90
F. Supp. 251 (D. Neb. 1950), affd, 189 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1951). See generally
Merrill, supra note 2, at 9.
See, e.g., 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 54-56. See generally Bonfield,
supra note 8, at 833-40; F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 109; Curran & Sacks, The
MassachusettsAdministrative ProcedureAct, 37 B. I. L. REV. 70, 78 (1957).
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980) with 1946 MODEL
ACT, supra note 2, § 1(3), at 203.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
Id. §§ 84-913 to -915 (Reissue 1976). See notes 136-47 & accompanying text infra.
But see notes 47-49 & accompanying text supra. Obviously, the problem illustrated by this example is not eliminated if local school districts are found not
to be subject to the Act; this description of the problem is merely an example
of a generic problem. For other examples of situations in which less formal
procedures may be more appropriate than the Nebraska APA contested case
procedures, see 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 8, at 105.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 581-82. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267 (1975).
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constitutional mandates. 7 8 A more detailed exclusion is necessary
or, in the alternative, an optional and less
formal contested case
79
procedure should be provided by the Act.
A final point should be made about the interrelationship of the
"rule" and "contested case" definitions in the Nebraska APA. Unlike the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 80 and the 1980 Proposed Act,81 the two definitions in the Nebraska APA are not
mutually exclusive and comprehensive. That is, the Nebraska
APA does not, as the other acts do, specifically define "rule" and
then label everything else a "contested case." Rather, the Nebraska APA specifically defines both terms. Under the Nebraska
APA approach, there exists the possibility that the definitions will
82
be interpreted so as to leave a gap between the two definitions.
This gap may be advantageous if it allows preliminary, informal
and routine agency actions to escape the Act, since these actions
should not be covered by the Act anyway. 83 On the other hand, the
gap may render certain agency action unreviewable under the judicial review provisions of the Act 84 and may allow actions other
than those that could be classified as preliminary, informal and
routine to escape the Act. Having mutually exclusive and comprehensive definitions with specific exclusions which provide a policybased "gap" are preferable to the uncertain gap left by the Nebraska APA.
C.

Rule-Making Procedure

The Nebraska APA prescribes a minimum procedure that must
be followed by covered agencies when they engage in rule-making. 85 The goal of the procedure is to provide interested persons an
opportunity to present information and viewpoints to agency decisionmakers during the rule-making process without unduly hand86
cuffing the agency's ability to act expeditiously and economically.
78. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950). See also F. COOPER,
SUpra note 14, at 120.
79. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 105-07.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6), (7) (1976).
81. 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, §§ 1-102(1), (12), (17) at 8-12.
82. Obviously, another possibility is that the two definitions will be interpreted to
overlap one another. See notes 65-67 supra.
83. See Hazard, supra note 34, at 102-03. See generally Comment, supra note 44,
at 79.
84. See Bloomenthal, supra note 48, at 623.
85. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-903 to -906, -908 to -910, -916 (Reissue 1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1980). If the rule-making procedures of the Nebraska APA are not followed, an agency's rules will not become effective. Nebraska Nurses Ass'n v.
Board of Nursing, 205 Neb. 792, 795, 290 N.W.2d 453, 454 (1980); Weeks v. State
Bd. of Educ., 204 Neb. 659, 662, 284 N.W.2d 843, 845 (1979).
86. See Bonfield, supra note 8, at 845-48. See also ATTORNEY GENERAu's CoDMrr-
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In addition, the procedure includes certain filing and notice requirements intended to inform interested persons of agency law.
The Nebraska APA provides that any "interested person" may
attempt to initiate the rule-making process by petitioning an
agency to promulgate, amend or repeal a rule. 87 The Act also requires agencies to '"prescribe by rule the form for such petitions
and the procedure for their submission, consideration, and disposition. ' 88 As noted, the language only allows "interested persons" to
file such petitions. Presumably, this limitation is intended to provide agencies with a screening mechanism in the "unlikely event
that an agency is overwhelmed by a mob of eager beavers. '89 However, there is no evidence of a need for such a screening mechanism 90 and the 1980 Proposed Act allows "any person" to file such
petitions. 9 1 As a result, it may be advisable to remove the "interested person" requirement, especially since there is some indication that Nebraska
agencies may be strictly construing the
92
requirement.
The Nebraska agency response to the required rule-making
noted above has varied. Acting in good faith, some agencies have
93
promulgated detailed rules describing the petition procedure;
others have promulgated only skeletal procedures which barely
meet the legislative intent; 94 while still others have not promulgated procedures at all. 95 Finally, the Nebraska APA, like the 1946
Model Act upon which it is based, 96 does not provide any time limiTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERN-

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.

95.
96.

MENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1941).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-910 (Reissue 1976).
Id.
Merrill, supra note 2, at 16. See also Comment, supra note 44, at 86-87.
See, e.g., 13 UNIFORM LAws ANN.439-40 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (no cases are cited
which interpret the phrase "interested person" under the analogous provision of the 1961 MODEL ACT).
1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 56.
See, e.g., Rule 61-(5)(b), State Bd. of Educ., 2 Neb. Ad. Rules & Regs. ("[a]
petition ... shall contain a specific statement averring the legal capacity of
the petitioners to instigate the proceedings.") See also Rule 5-(2) (a) (iii), Department of Aeronautics, 3A Neb. Ad. Rules & Regs. 5-3.
See, e.g., Rule 3, Nebraska State Elec. Bd., 8 Neb. Ad. Rules & Regs. 3-1; Rule
66, Department of Agriculture, 6 Neb. Ad. Rules & Regs. 66-3 to -5.
See, e.g., Rule 20, Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 3 Neb. Ad. Rules & Regs. 20-1
provides that "[a] n application for the promulgation, amendment, repeal or
adoption of any Commission rule or regulation shall state the precise wording of the proposed rule and regulation and shall state briefly the reasons for
such promulgation, amendment, repeal, or adoption .... ." See also Rule
2(5), State Records Bd., 1 Neb. Ad. Rules & Regs. 2-2.
See, e.g., Department of Revenue, 4-5 Neb. Ad. Rules & Regs.; Game & Parks
Comm'n, 16 Neb. Ad. Rules & Regs.; Department of Veterans' Affairs, 15 Neb.
Ad. Rules & Regs.
See 1946 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, at 207.
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tations on the agency's response to a petition to promulgate,
amend or repeal a rule. Although some Nebraska agencies have
imposed such limitations on themselves, 97 a statutory limitation
that would apply to all agencies is preferable. 98
Once initiated, either by an interested person or the agency itself, the rule-making procedure prescribed by the Act is relatively
simple and straightforward. Agencies intending to engage in rulemaking9 9 must first hold a public hearing on their proposed
action. 100 Notice of the hearing must be given to the Revisor of
Regulations and the public at least twenty days prior to the hearing. 0 1 Rules, 10 2 once they are promulgated, must be submitted to
the Attorney General for his consideration as to statutory authority and constitutionality, 103 then approved by the Governor' 04 and,
finally, filed with the Revisor of Regulations and with the Secretary
05
of State.
The rule-making procedure, then begins with a notice of hearing that the agency must give to the Revisor of Regulations and
publish in a newspaper having general circulation in the state.
97. See, e.g., Rule 66(2) (d) (ii), Department of Agriculture, 6 Neb. Ad. Rules &
Regs. 66-5; Rule 66, Department of Environmental Control, 22 Neb. Ad. Rules
& Regs. 66-1.
98. See 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 18, at 212 (30 days); 1980 PROPOSED ACT,
supra note 9, at 56 (60 days).
99. The Nebraska APA requires agencies to engage in certain rule-making: (1)
§§ 84-909(1) and 84-913 require agencies to adopt rules governing their procedures, see, First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Department of Banking, 187 Neb.
562, 569, 192 N.W.2d 736, 740 (1971); School Dist. No. 8 v. State Bd. of Educ., 176
Neb. 722, 732-34, 127 N.W.2d 458, 464-65 (1964) (failure to promulgate required
procedural rules resulted in invalidation of Board's authority to hold hearings); see also Weiner v. State Real Estate Comm'n, 184 Neb. 752, 754, 171
N.W.2d 783, 785-86 (1969) (required rule-making does not require agencies to
set out statutory, procedural requirements in their rules); and (2) § 84-910
requires agencies to adopt rules relating to petitions by persons requesting
the agency to promulgate, amend or repeal a rule, see notes 92-96 & accompanying text supra. In addition, § 84-909(2) directs agencies to promulgate descriptive statements of their procedures. Since these "descriptive
statements" are described as a "supplement" to agency rules, the inference is
that their promulgation need not follow the rule-making procedure required
by the Act. Nevertheless, the descriptive statements do fall within the Act's
definition of "rule." See NEB.REv. STAT. § 84-901(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980). Legislative clarification would be helpful.
100. NEB.REV. STAT. § 84-907 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The Governor, for good cause,
can waive the notice requirements. Id. See note 115 infra.
101. NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-907 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
102. This term is intended to cover not only the initial promulgation of rules, but
also the amendment or repeal of rules. See id. §§ 84-901(2), 84-907 (Cum.
Supp. 1980).
103. Id. § 84-905.01 (Reissue 1976).
104. Id. § 84-908 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
105. Id. §§ 84-902, -906, -908 (Reissue 1976 & Cur. Supp. 1980).
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Presumably, the notice to the Revisor of Regulations must be accompanied by draft copies or working copies of the proposed rule,
since such copies must be available at the office of the Revisor of
Regulations (and at the business office of the agency) at the time
of giving notice. 10 6 The required contents of the notice itself are
inadequately delineated by the Act. The Act specifically requires
that the notice contain a declaration of the availability of draft or
work copies of the proposed rule, 0 7 and since it is a notice of hearing, the Act implies that information as to the general purpose,
time, date and place of the public hearing must also be provided. 0 8
The Act does not specifically require the notice to contain the text
of the proposed rule, 09 information on the nature of the hearing," 0
or background or explanatory information."' The Act permits
the
2
Governor to waive the notice of hearing for good cause."
The Nebraska APA vests broad discretion in agencies to deter106. Id. § 84-907 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The requirement that draft copies be available to the public is of only limited utility. While it provides some notice to
the public of the agency's intended direction and focus, nothing precludes the
agency from substantially revising the rule before final promulgation. It
would be preferable if the statute precluded a substantial change in the proposed rule. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 3-107, at 40-41. Then, if
public comment dictated a substantial change in the initially proposed rule,
that rule-making proceeding could be terminated and a new one with the substantially changed rule as the proposed rule could be commenced. Such a
procedure would better insure full and informed public comment.
107. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-907 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
108. Id.
109. Indeed, since the Act requires draft rules to be on file and the notice to contain a declaration of the availability of such draft rules, the clear inference is
that the text of the proposed rule need not be contained in the notice of hearing. That is certainly the interpretation of the Act that has been followed by
state agencies as evidenced by the numerous notices of hearing in the Nebraska Administrative Rules and Regulations. Publication of the full text of
the proposed rule in the notice of hearing would "assure that affected parties
have fully adequate warning of the precise terms of the contemplated rule
before the rule is finally adopted." 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 34. In
particular, such publication would assure adequate warning to affected parties in western Nebraska who do not have ready access to the draft copies
filed at the Lincoln offices of the agency and the Revisor of Regulations.
110. The Nebraska APA gives agencies broad discretion as to the nature of the
hearing in rule-making proceedings. See notes 113-18 infra. Consequently,
some information in the notice on the nature of the hearing would be helpful.
See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 3-103(4), (5), at 34.
111. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 3-103(1), (2), at 34.
112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-907 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Until recently, the Governor
could waive both the notice of hearing and the public hearing requirements
of § 84-907. See L.B. 585, 1978 Neb. Laws 394. In 1980, the Legislature amended
§ 84-907 to permit waiver of only the "notice of public hearing," but not of the
hearing itself. L.B. 846, 1980 Neb. Laws 855. The amendment also specified to
a limited extent the content of "good cause" to waive the public hearing requirement. Id.
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mine the nature of the subsequent rule-making hearing. All that is
explicitly required is that it be a "public hearing."1 3 A largely duplicative provision that required that "interested persons [be afforded] an opportunity to submit data or views orally or in writing"
was repealed in 1980.114 In contrast to the 1961 Model Act 15 and
the 1980 Proposed Act, 116 the decision to allow or disallow oral testimony is left solely to the discretion of the agency. Ironicallyeven though a public hearing is required, there is no requirement
that the agency consider in any manner the arguments advanced
by interested persons. 117 The viability of the public hearing requirement is further weakened by the timing of the filings and approvals required by the Act.118
To complete the rule-making process, the agency must submit
the rule to the Attorney General for his consideration as to its stat113. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-907 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
114. L.B. 846, 1980 Neb. Laws 855. The quoted language was derived from the 1946
MODEL AcT, supra note 2, § 2(3), at 205, and vested broad discretion in the
rule-making agency. See United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S.
224 (1973); Merrill, supra note 2, at 16. Although a colorable argument could
be forwarded that the repeal of the quoted language permits an agency to
deny interested persons an opportunity to submit oral or written data or
views, that interpretation would undercut the "public hearing" requirement
of § 84-907. A preferable interpretation is that the repealed section, see L.B.
846, § 2, 1980 Neb. Laws 855, 856, merely duplicated the requirements of § 84907; that its repeal was a housekeeping move; and that, while the agency still
retains broad discretion as to the nature of the hearing, the discretion does
not extend to prohibiting written or oral statements since that would undercut the essence of the public hearing requirement.
115. The 1961 Model Act requires an oral hearing for substantive rules if requested by 25 persons, a governmental subdivision or agency, or an association having not less than 25 members. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 18,
§ 3(a) (2), at 209-10.
116. The 1980 Proposed Act adds a legislative committee to monitor agency action
and its counsel to those individuals or groups listed in the 1961 Model Act
who can trigger an oral hearing. 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 3-104, at
35-36. See note 115 supra.
117. Both the 1961 Model Act and the 1980 Proposed Act impose an obligation on
agencies to pay some attention to comments received during the rule-making
process. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 18, § 3(a) (2), at 210 ('Trhe agency shall
consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed
rule"); 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 3-106(c), at 39 ("Before the adoption of a rule, an agency shall consider the written and oral submissions or
any memorandum summarizing oral submissions provided for by this Article").
118. The Act requires approval by the Governor and filing with the Revisor of Reg" NEB. REV. STAT.
ulations "after a hearing has been set on such rule ....
§ 84-908 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). Thus, an agency can seek the
Governor's approval of a rule and file it with the Revisor of Regulations
before the required public hearing has been held. Clearly, an agency which
has received the Governor's approval will be inhibited from subsequently
amending the rule in response to comments received at the public hearing.
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utory authority and constitutionality, 1 9 have it approved by the
Governor, and file it with the Revisor of Regulations and the Secretary of State. 120 No rule is valid unless it has been (1) approved by
the Governor; 12 1 (2) filed with the Revisor of Regulations for five
days; 122 and (3) filed with the Secretary of State on the date desig123
nated and in the form prescribed by the Revisor of Regulations.
119. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-905.01 (Reissue 1976). The submission to the Attorney
General is curious since the Attorney General's decision is completely toothless. If he approves the rule, the rule is stamped with his dated and signed
stamp of approval. If he disapproves the rule, presumably the rule is not
stamped, but the rule-making procedure can continue unimpeded. The purpose of the requirement must be to notify the agency and the public of questionable rules. It is doubtful whether this purpose justifies the burden and
expense of the review.
120. See notes 104-05 & accompanying text supra.
121. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-908 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra
note 9, at 58-59.
122. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-906 (Reissue 1976). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-908
(Cum. Supp. 1980). This requirement insures a prompt filing with the Revisor of Regulations, and hence, prompt public access to the rules. See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 84-906.03 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-906 (Reissue 1976). The timing of the required filing with
the Secretary of State is particularly obscure; the drafting of § 84-906 is particularly inartistic. The 1947 enactment of § 84-906 was clear. "No rule required
under this act to be filed with the Secretary of State shall be valid as against
any person until the certified copy of the rule shall have been so filed ......
Administrative Procedure Act, Ch. 350, § 6, 1947 Neb. Laws 1097, 1100. Thus,
under that Act, rules were not effective until they had been filed with the
Secretary of State. See School Dist. No. 228 v. State Bd. of Educ., 164 Neb. 148,
150, 82 N.W.2d 8, 10 (1957). In 1973, however, the legislature amended § 84-906.
It created the position of Revisor of Regulations and required agency rules to
be filed with the Revisor for five days before they could become effective.
L.B. 134, § 4, 1973 Neb. Laws 369, 372. In addition, the legislature revised the
language quoted above from the 1947 Act: "No rule required under this act to
be filed with the Secretary of State and Revisor of Regulations shall remain
valid as against any person until the certified copy of the rule shall have been
so filed on the date designated and in the forn prescribed by the Revisor of
Regulations.....
'
Id. The amendment is inartfully drafted because the
term "remain valid" and the word "until" simply do not make sense together
in this context. What the legislature probably intended was that the word
"until" be read "unless." Thus, no rule required to be filed shall remain valid
unless the rule is fied with the Secretary of State on the date designated and
in the form prescribed. As a result, a rule can become valid, assuming the
other requisites of the Act have been met, five days after filing with the Revisor of Regulations. A filing with the Secretary of State is not required. However, the rule will not "remain valid" "unless" the rule is fied with the
Secretary of State on the date "designated." The date "designated" by the
Nebraska APA is no later than June 30 of each year. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84902(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980). So if new rules are not ified with the Secretary of
State by June 30, they will become invalid on that date.
The complex statutory analysis required by the obscure language of § 84906 should not, however, overshadow a more basic point: the function of the
Secretary of State under the Nebraska APA is an anachronism. While the
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The Nebraska APA provides a triple-barrelled procedure for notifying interested persons of rules that have been promulgated
pursuant to the Act. 124 First, the agency itself is required to publish its rules "in such manner as the agency shall determine, to
bring, as far as practicable, the existence and scope of the rule to
the attention of all persons affected thereby."' 25 Second, each
agency is required to make copies of its rules available to interested persons on request. If the agency does not do so, its rules
are not effective.' 2 6 Third, and most significantly, the Revisor of
Regulations is required to compile the rules of all agencies and distribute copies of the compilation to the state library, to each
county law library, and (at a price) to all interested persons. 127 As
a result of these requirements, the rules of Nebraska agencies are
for the most part available to interested persons. However, mere
availability does not fully satisfy the goal of providing notice; the
available rules must also be organized and indexed so that they
can be used effectively and efficiently. 12 8 The volumes of the Nein this
braska Administrative Rules and Regulations are deficient
129
regard; they are poorly indexed and difficult to use.
Finally, the Nebraska APA provides for a review of agency rules
after they have been in effect for a year. The Act provides that, if

124.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Secretary of State served a meaningful function at one time, see, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, Ch. 350, § 6, 1947 Neb. Laws 1097, 1100, his function
now-to maintain a file of all agency rules that is open to public inspectionis duplicative of the functions of the Revisor of Regulations. See NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 84-902(2), -906.03 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The retention of the minimal
role of the Secretary of State is nothing more than a concession to outmoded
separation of powers notions.
The Nebraska APA contains a number of drafting oversights which probably
resulted from the "patchwork quilt" nature of the Act's enactment. See notes
1-5 & accompanying text supra. For example, in several places the Act refers
to "rules and regulations." See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901.02(1), -904(2),
-906.03, -908.01, .02(2), .03, .04 (Cum. Supp. 1980). That is careless drafting
since the Act defines the word "rule" to include both rules and regulations.
Id. § 84-901(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980). Similarly, the Act makes several references to the "Administrative Rules and Regulations Review Committee," see,
e.g., Id. §§ 84-904, -908.02(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980), even though the word "Committee" is defined to mean the Administrative Rules and Regulations Review
Committee. Id. § 84-901(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-903 (Reissue 1976).
Id. § 84-905.
Id. § 84-906.03(3).
See Davis, An Administrative ProcedureAct for Arizona, 2 Aiuz. L REV. 17,
25-26 (1960).
The Nebraska Legislature has exhibited an awareness of this problem. Neb.
L.R. 238, 88TH LEG., 1sT SEss., NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE JouRNAL, at 23-24 (1980)
(review of current set of rules and regulations of state administrative agencies and organization of system in a manner which is easily accessible).
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persons are interested in testifying about a rule, 130 the Revisor of
Regulations must hold a public hearing on it within fifteen days
before or after the first anniversary of the rule's filing date. 13 1 The
purpose of the hearing is to gather information to enable the Legislature's Administrative Rules and Regulations Review Committee
to determine whether the rule is "carrying out the
legislative in32
tent of the act which authorized [its] adoption."'
D.

Contested Case Procedures

The Nebraska APA provides an exiguous procedure for administrative adjudications covered by the Act. 33 All administrative
procedure acts that prescribe adjudication procedures walk a
tightrope between procedures so general or minimal as to be
meaningless and procedures so specific that they unduly restrict
agency flexibility. 34 The Nebraska APA
topples off the tightrope
1 35
to the overly general or minimal side.
The contested case procedures require agencies to afford to all
13 7
parties 13 6 an opportunity for a hearing after reasonable notice.
130. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-906.03(5) (Cum. Supp. 1980). If no one responds to the
notice of hearing, the Revisor of Regulations is to cancel the hearing.
131. Id. § 84-906.03(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
132. Id.
133. As noted before, the Nebraska APA contested case procedures only apply to
"formal" adjudications, i.e., adjudications "required by law or constitutional
right to be determined after an agency hearing." Id. § 84-901(3) (Cum. Supp.
1980); see note 68 supra.
134.
[With respect to administrative procedures,] effort must be made to
avoid not only the Scylla of no restatement of norms governing
agency procedure but also the Charybdis of a rigid procedural code
'judicializing' administrative processes or over-standardizing
them. . . . [That is], creators of a true administrative procedure act
must be aware of the tendency to make legislation so general as to be
meaningless, or, at the other extreme, so concrete as to force dissimilar agencies into the same Procrustean mold.
Davis, supra note 128, at 27.
135. See notes 148-52 & accompanying text infra.
136. Even though the Act affords '"parties" many rights, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 84913 (Reissue 1976) (notice of and opportunity for hearing, right to present
evidence and argument); id. § 84-914(1) (right to request that rules of evidence be applied); id. § 84-914(4) (right to cross-examine witnesses and present rebuttal evidence); id. § 84-914(5) (right to notification of official notice);
id. § 84-915 (right to notice of agency decision), the term "party" is not defined in any way by the Act. Perhaps this was done on the theory that the
issue would vary greatly from agency to agency and, thus could best be handled by case-by-case adjudication. See Tunks, The Model Act Route to Improvement ofIowa Administrative Procedure,33 IowA L. REv. 356, 362 (1948).
On the other hand, although the absence of cases on the issue in Nebraska
would indicate this has not been a major problem, a definition could help
reduce harassment of agencies by persons with remote interests seeking to
intervene as parties. See Curran & Sacks, supra note 71, at 87. See also, 1961
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The Act specifies the contents of the notice of hearing138 and confers certain powers on agencies to enable them to conduct orderly
and meaningful hearings. 139 A relaxed evidentiary standard is provided by the Act, 140 recognizing both that administrative hearing
officers are not always capable of making fine-tuned evidentiary
distinctions1 41 and that those same officers sometimes possess an
MODEL ACT, supra note 18, § 1(5), at 207; 1980 PROPOSED AcT, supra note 9,

§§ 1-102(13), 4-209, at 11, 85-86.
137. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-913 (Reissue 1976). Of course, nothing in the Act precludes a disposition by informal settlement or default. Id.
138. The statute specifies that the notice must contain the time and place of the
hearing and the issues involved, "but if, by reason of the nature of the proceeding, the issues cannot be fully stated in advance of the hearing or if subsequent amendment of the issues is necessary, they shall be fully stated as
soon as practicable." Id. § 84-913 (Reissue 1976). See J K & J, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 194 Neb. 413, 417-18, 231 N.W.2d 694, 697-98
(1975); County of Blaine v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 180 Neb.
471, 473, 143 N.W.2d 880, 882 (1966). The 1980 Proposed Act requires more information in the notice. 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 4-206, at 82.
139. The Act confers on agencies the power to administer oaths, issue subpoenas,
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, and cause
the depositions of witnesses to be taken. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(2) (Reissue 1976). This conferral of power is important because (1) it would be extremely difficult for agencies to hold hearings without these basic powers,
and (2) in the absence of such a statutory conferral of power, agencies have
no such inherent powers. See F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 295. Although the
Nebraska APA does not provide an enforcement procedure, presumably if an
agency subpoena is not obeyed the agency can seek judicial enforcement.
Cf., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (Court upheld the constitutionality of provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act which
provided for judicial enforcement of agency subpoenas).
140. The general evidentiary standard provided by the Act is as follows:
"An agency may admit and give probative effect to evidence which
possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. It shall give effect to the
rules of privilege recognized by law.....
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(1) (Reissue 1976). The standard permits agencies to
accept evidence that would be inadmissible in most courts. See City of Lincoin v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 191 Neb. 556, 567, 216 N.W.2d 722, 729
(1974); County of Sioux v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 190 Neb.
198,202,207 N.W.2d 219,221 (1973). See also Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn.
705, 710, 372 A.2d 110, 115, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1976); Wallace v. District
Unemployment Compensation Bd., 294 A.2d 177, 179 (D.C. App. 1972); Michel
v. Department of Public Safety Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 341 So.2d
1161, 1165 (La. App. 1976). However, "agencies are not turned loose to utilize
evidence of the 'King John, somebody told me, said to a person he knew'
type." Merrill, supra note 2, at 28. The standard has been criticized, though,
as too liberal. As one commentator has noted "[e]very hearing officer considers himself a reasonably prudent man ... and so, under this rule, the hearing
officer is free to accept whatever he may wish to rely on." F. COOPER, supra
note 14, at 386.
141. The Act, e.g., provides that agencies: "may exclude incompetent, irrelevant,
immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence .... " NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-
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expertise that should not be constricted by overly formalistic standards. 142 Nevertheless, the Act provides that parties may, in effect,
"buy" more stringent evidentiary rules. 143 Under the Act, parties
are entitled to cross-examine witnesses and to submit rebuttal evi145
dence. 144 The agency is required to prepare an official record
and the Act requires that the decision be based exclusively on that
record.1 46 The decision, if adverse to a party, must be in writing or
stated in the record; must include findings of fact and conclusions

142.

143.

144.

145.
146.

914(1) (Reissue 1976) (emphasis added). To the extent it can be inferred
from the word "may" that such evidence can be accepted by administrative
tribunals, the standard is somewhat startling. On the other hand, an inflexible "shall exclude" standard, see 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 18, § 10(1), at
215, has been criticized as unworkable in an administrative setting:
[The inflexible "shall exclude" standard] proposes to impose as a
categorical directive on agencies, whose members are often completely without legal training or experience, a rule of conduct which
experienced trial judges find extremely difficult to adhere to, even as
a matter of policy. It would seem that, rather than impose a requirement which is calculated to strike dismay into the heart of an experienced trier of fact and which in any event would doubtless
precipitate countless hours of wrangling, it would have been more
discreet to make this provision only precatory.
Dakin, The Revised Model State AdministrativeProcedure Act-Critique and
Commentary, 25 LA. L. REV. 799, 809 (1965) (footnotes omitted). See also,
Merrill, supra note 2, at 27-28; Comment, supra note 44, at 96-97.
Section 84-914(5) provides that agencies can take notice of some facts that
judges could judicially notice and, "in addition, may take notice of general,
technical, or scientific facts within [their] specialized knowledge." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 84-914(5) (Reissue 1976). The Act provides that the parties must be
notified of the agency's intent to take official notice of certain facts and be
afforded an opportunity to contest the noticed facts. See Durousseau v.
Nebraska State Racing Comm'n, 194 Neb. 288, 294, 231 N.W. 2d 566, 570 (1975);
J K & J, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 194 Neb. 413, 418, 421-22,
231 N.W.2d 694, 698 (1975).
The Nebraska APA provides that a party can bind an administrative agency.
to the rules of evidence applicable in district court if a timely, written request
is made and the party agrees to pay the resultant costs, including the cost of
court reporting services. NaB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(1) (Reissue 1976). See
Gateway Bank v. Department of Banking, 192 Neb. 109, 219 N.W.2d 211 (1974).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(4) (Reissue 1976). The right to cross-examination,
however, is less than absolute. In Box Butte County v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 206 Neb. 696, 295 N.W.2d 670 (1980), the counties contended that they were denied their right of cross-examination. The Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected their claim. Noting that there were 2,000 pages of
testimony and five transfer cases containing documentary evidence, the court
held that the Nebraska APA should not be strictly applied. Thus the seemingly absolute language of § 84-914(4) can be overridden by a sufficiently compelling manageability interest.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-913 (Reissue 1976). But see note 134 supra.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(3) (Reissue 1976). See Douglas County Bank v. Department of Banking, 187 Neb. 545, 549, 192 N.W.2d 401, 403 (1971); County of
Sarpy v. State Bd. of Equalization &Assessment, 185 Neb. 760, 762, 178 N.W.2d
765, 767 (1970); County of Sioux v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
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must be mailed or delivered to the parties or their attorof law; and
14 7
neys.
Unfortunately, the Nebraska APA's contested case procedures
are as notable for what they do not contain as for what they do
contain. The Act simply ignores several problem areas. 14 For example, the Act provides no guidance on the appropriate agency review procedure where a subordinate hearing officer, rather than
the agency itself, conducts the hearing and renders the initial decision. 14 9 The Act does not deal with disqualification problems, that
is, problems arising when the agency's decisionmaker is unfit by
reason of prejudice, partiality or interest. 5 0 Ex parte communications between contested case decisionmakers and other agency
employees or parties to the proceedings are not limited by the
Act.' 5 ' The Act does not include an explicit guarantee of a right to
counsel in contested cases. 152 In summary, the minimal contested
case procedures of the Nebraska APA are insufficient, particularly
in light of the many issues left untouched by the Act.
E. Legislative Review of Agency Rules
In 1972, the Nebraska Legislature created a legislative committee to continuously study agency rules. 5 3 The Administrative
Rules and Regulations Review Committee 5 4 was directed to pres185 Neb. 741, 743, 178 N.W.2d 754, 756 (1970). See generally F. COOPER, supra
note 14, at 430-31.
147. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-915 (Reissue 1976). See Prigge v. Johns, 186 Neb. 761, 762,
186 N.W.2d 497, 497 (1971); Doran v. Johns, 186 Neb. 321, 324, 182 N.W.2d 900,
902-03 (1971); Prigge v. Johns, 184 Neb. 103, 106, 165 N.W.2d 559, 561-62 (1969).
148. In fairness, it should be noted that the contested case procedures of the Nebraska APA are based for the most part on the 1946 Model Act which also
failed to deal with several of the noted problem areas. See 1946 MODEL ACT,
supra note 2, §§ 8, 9, 11, at 208-13. But see id. § 10, at 212 (1946 Model Act
provides guidelines where a subordinate, rather than the agency itself, issues
the initial decision).
149. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 4-216, at 95-96; 1961 MODEL ACT,supra

note 18, § 11, at 217; 1946 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, § 10, at 212. See generally
F. COOPER, supra note 14, at 445-65. Subordinate hearing officers are utilized
in Nebraska. See Monson v. Meidig, 180 Neb. 818, 821, 146 N.W.2d 198, 200
(1966).
150. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 4-202, at 77. See generally Merrill,
supra note 2, at 33-36.
151. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 4-213, at 90-91; 1961 MODEL AcT, supra

note 18, § 13, at 218-19.
152. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, § 4-203, at 78. The Nebraska APA does
provide an indirect indication that parties are entitled to legal representation.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-915 (Reissue 1976) ("A copy of the decision... shall

be delivered or mailed to each party or his attorney of record") (emphasis
added).
153. L.B. 373, 1972 Neb. Laws.
154. L.B. 44, 1978 Neb. Laws 64. The 1978 Act also, inter alia, changed the name
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ent recommendations to the legislature at the beginning of each
session. 155 In 1978, the Nebraska Legislature significantly expanded the powers of the Committee by giving it the power to temintroduce a
porarily suspend agency rules 5 6 and, if necessary, to
157
bill in the legislature to repeal the suspended rules.
The Act prescribes the procedure which the Committee must
follow in exercising its expanded powers. Agency rules are referred to the Committee by the Revisor of Regulations. 58 When
complaints are received on a rule, the Committee may hold a public hearing. 159 If the Committee finds that the rule does not "conform to the needs of the people affected by such rule" or is not
"consistent with legislative intent or responsive to the issue addressed by the enabling legislation," it can recommend to the
agency that it amend or repeal the rule. 60 If the agency has not
done so within thirty days of the recommendation, the Committee
can, after complying with the rule-making requirements of the Act,
suspend the rule.1 6 ' After suspension, the Committee must place
the issue before the legislature in the form of a bill to repeal the
rule. 62 If the bill is defeated, the rule is "unsuspended" and the
Committee cannot suspend it again for twelve calendar months. If
agency cannot re-issue
the bill passes, the rule is repealed and the163
it absent specific legislative authorization.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to fully discuss
the issue, 64 the Committee's power to suspend and the legisla-

155.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

and the composition of the committee. Compare L.B. 316, § 1, 1975 Neb. Laws
639 (nine member committee named Legislature's Committee on Administrative Agency Rules and Regulations) with L.B. 44, § 2, 1978 Neb. Laws 64, 65
(seven member committee named Administrative Rules and Regulations Review Committee).
Id. In 1973, the Act was amended to provide that the power to make recommendations to the Legislature included "the power to recommend to the legislature that the original enabling legislation serving as authority for
promulgation of such rules be repealed, changed, altered, amended, or modified in such manner as it deems advisable." L.B. 134, § 2(2), 1973 Neb. Laws
369, 371. The 1973 Act also provided that if such legislative action was taken
the targeted rule would become null and void. Id. Obviously, this merely
reaffirmed, but did not increase, the Legislature's power over administrative
agencies.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-908.02 to .03 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
Id. § 84-908.04 to .05.
Id. § 84-908.
Id. § 84-908.02(2).
Id.
Id. § 84-908.03.
Id. § 84-908.04.
Id. § 84-908.05.
A full discussion of the issue would require another article! See, e.g., Atkins
v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977); 43 Op. U.S. Att'y. Gen. 10 (1977);
Abourezk, The CongressionalVeto: A ContemporaryResponse to Executive
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ture's power to repeal agency rules are of questionable constitutional validity. 165 It can be argued that the legislature's power to
repeal agency rules violates the separation of powers provision of
the Nebraska Constitution. 16 6 That is certainly the opinion of the
Attorney General of Nebraska:
[W] e believe the repeal of rules and regulations, like their adoption, is an
administrative function, and cannot be exercised even by the legislature
itself. Without question the legislature could, if it saw fit, accomplish the
invalidation of almost any rule or regulation by amending the statute
under which it was promulgated, removing the foundation upon which the
rule or regulation was based. But to simply 'repeal' the rule or regulation
(which was not 'passed' by the Legislature in the first place) would create
an anomaly. The basic statute would continue to authorize the rule or regulation, but the 'repealer' would forbid it. In any event, we believe it
would be difficult to sustain such an action against an attack based upon
Article 1, Section 1.167

This opinion of the Nebraska Attorney General is an overly formalistic interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine and of the
legislative repeal provisions of the Nebraska APA.
The Attorney General believes that the legislature cannot adopt
or repeal rules, which may be true. However, the legislature can
certainly amend an agency's statutory authority to mandate or preclude certain rules. By "repealing" an agency rule, the legislature
is doing nothing more than amending the agency's statutory authority. To illustrate, assume that the Nebraska Legislature, concerned over a proliferation of shocking deaths, passes a law
prohibiting the use of hair dryers in bathtubs. The legislature then
creates an agency to administer the statute, giving it the power to
promulgate rules. The agency promulgates a rule interpreting the
statute to preclude the use of toaster ovens in bathtubs. 168 The
Attorney General states that the agency's promulgation of the rule
was an administrative function and could not have been exercised

165.
166.

167.
168.

Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives,52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Bruff &
Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HAAv. L. REv. 1369 (1977); Javits & Klein, Congressional
Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 52 N.Y.U.L
REv. 455 (1977); Miller & Knapp, The CongressionalVeto: Preserving the ConstitutionalFramework,52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Taylor, Legislative Vetoes and
the Massachusetts Separation of Powers Doctrine, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1
(1979); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at CongressionalControl of the
Executive, 63 CALn?. L. REV. 983 (1975).
See 24 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 35 (1977).
Article II, section 1 of the Nebraska Constitution provides: 'The powers of
the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the
Legislative, Executive and Judicial, and no person or collection of persons
being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging
to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."
24 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 35, at 38 (1977).
Obviously on the dubious theory that toaster ovens can be used to dry hair.
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by the legislature itself. 169 Even if correct, the statement is irrelevant. The legislature, if it desired to do so, did not have to promulgate a rule to outlaw the use of toaster ovens in bathtubs; it could
have simply included the prohibition in the statute itself. Similarly, if the legislature utilizes the Nebraska APA procedure and
repeals the agency rule, the legislature is not invading some illdefined administrative province. Rather, it is merely limiting the
statutory authority of the agency to promulgate rules; in effect, it is
amending the initial statutory enactment. 170 Certainly, the Attorney General would not say that the legislature is precluded, after
he sees the agency's toaster oven rule, from amending the initial
statute to outlaw the use of hair dryers, but not toaster ovens, in
bathtubs. Although in a slightly different form, that is what the
legislature does when it repeals a rule under the Nebraska APA.171
The Committee's power to suspend regulations does not fare as
well under constitutional analysis. As the Attorney General points
out, 1 72 the Committee's action in suspending a rule cannot be legislative. Legislative powers can only be exercised by the legislature itself and then only in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution. 173 Thus, the Attorney General concludes, the act
must be administrative and, hence, beyond the power of a legislative committee. But what if the action of suspending rules is administrative in nature? Has not the legislature merely created an
administrative agency with the power to suspend rules and appointed to it members who happen to be legislators? Even if the
Committee is viewed in this light, its power to suspend rules can
probably not be upheld. First, if the Committee is characterized as
169. "[T] he repeal of rules and regulations, like their adoption, is an administrative function, and cannot be exercised even by the legislature itself." 24 Op.
Neb. Att'y Gen. 35, at 38 (1977).
170. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 63 (["A legislative vetoI in effect,
).
would constitute a pro tanto narrowing of the authorizing legislation ....
Viewed in this light, the anomaly noted by the Attorney General is illusory.
The "repealer" limits the agency's rule-making authority by effectively
amending its statutory basis. As a result, the basic statute can no longer be
said to authorize the disapproved rule.
171. The repeal provisions of the Nebraska APA are certainly less troublesome
than so-called "one-house veto" provisions whereby one house of the legislative body can disapprove regulations. See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d
1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977). See also State v. A.L.IV.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska
1980). See generally 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 63. The Nebraska
APA provisions do not, obviously, present bicameralism issues, nor do they
undermine the Governor's veto powers. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-908.05
(Cum. Supp. 1980) (preserves Governor's right to veto a bill which repeals an
agency rule).
172. 24 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 35, at 38 (1977).
173. Id.
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an agency, its members must be appointed by the Governor' 74 and
75
not elected by the legislature, as the Nebraska APA provides.
Second, the exercise of discretion by an agency must be circumscribed by legislative standards. 176 The standards circumscribing
may not be specific enough to
the Committee's suspension powers
77
withstand constitutional analysis.
Finally, it must be noted that, even if the legislature's power to
repeal and the Committee's power to suspend are constitutional,
the legislative review provisions of the Nebraska APA may be unwise. The benefits received from enhanced legislative oversight
may be outweighed by other foreseeable effects of the legislative
review process. For example, it seems probable that when agency
decisionmakers begin formulating proposed rules, they will negotiate with members of the Administrative Rules and Regulations Review Committee to insure that the rules are acceptable to the
Committee. Since the negotiations would not be open to the public, the political accountability of the legislators would be weakened and the open rule-making process favored by the Nebraska
78
APA would be undermined:
Because legislators could effectively make law without casting votes, the
public would have no way to know who advocated what position. Because
administrators would be revealing their conclusions through off-the-record discussions, the courts would be unable to test their logic and their
inferences. Rather than making the agencies more accountable..., such
political rule making
would render the entire government less accounta179
ble to the people.

In addition to this concern, vigorous legislative oversight may result in less agency rule-making. To the extent the legislative review process renders rule-making unpredictable or politically
hazardous, agencies, if they have a choice, may conduct their business through adjudication rather than rule-making.180 If this oc174. NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
175. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-901.01(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
176. See, e.g., State v. Cutwright, 193 Neb. 303,226 N.W.2d 771 (1975); Lincoln Dairy
Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Board of Regents v. County
of Lancaster, 154 Neb. 398, 48 N.W.2d 221 (1951). See generally Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 464-65, 283 N.W.2d 12, 24 (1979).
177. The Nebraska APA permits suspension of a rule if the rule does not "conform
to the needs of the people affected by" the rule or if the rule is not "consistent
with legislative intent or responsive to the issue addressed by the enabling
legislation." NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-908.02(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
178. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1408 to -1414 (Reissue 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
179. Reich, Carter, Congress Plot Strategies to Win Control Over Regulations,
Nat'l L.J., July 16, 1979, at 21, col. 1.
180. Many, if not most, agencies have the statutory authority to both make rules
and conduct adjudications. Agencies have considerable discretion in deciding whether to proceed by rule-making or adjudication: "[Tihe choice made
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

curred, the many advantages of rule-making, including
participation by interested parties with a broad range of views,
greater certainty and advance notice of agency standards, and increased efficiency, would be lost.181 Consequently, the legislative
review provisions of the Nebraska APA are subject to question on
both constitutional and policy grounds.
F.

Judicial Review of Rules and Contested Cases

The power of courts to review agency action is largely a negative power. That is, courts generally act to curb excessive exercises of agency power; they seldom compel agency action that was
improperly withheld. Despite this limitation, judicial review
serves to cause "overzealous officials to... think once, at any rate,
even if not twice, before they act,' 82 to preserve the judiciary as
the final arbiter of constitutional and statutory provisions, and to
provide an avenue of relief for persons adversely affected by
183
agency action.
The Nebraska APA has three basic provisions which provide for
judicial review of agency rules and contested case determinations.1 8 4 These provisions are particularly important in Nebraska
because the supreme court has determined that "[t ]he right of appeal [from agency action] in this state is clearly statutory and unless [a] statute provides for an appeal... , such right does not
exist.' 85 Thus, in the absence of such provisions or other statutes
specifically providing for review, agency rules or contested case determinations in Nebraska would not be subject to judicial review.
The Nebraska APA, however, has no provision providing for review
of an agency action which is neither a rule nor a contested case, 186

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

186.

that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). See also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
See Reich, supranote 179, at 21. See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
202-03 (1947) (rule-making is the preferred mode of proceeding).
HORSKY, THE WASB-tNGTON LAWYER 78 (1952), quoted in, Davis, supra note
128, at 29.
See generally Davis, supra note 128, at 29.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-911, -917 (Reissue 1976); id. 84-912 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
See notes 189-202 & accompanying text infra.
Gretna Pub. School Dist. No. 37 v. State Bd.of Educ., 201 Neb. 769, 772, 272
N.W.2d 268, 269 (1978); Lydick v. Johns, 185 Neb. 717, 178 N.W.2d 581 (1970).
See generally Note, The Right to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency
Action Nebraska's 'ClearlyStatutory' Rule, 58 NEB. L. REv. 1139 (1979).
A substantial number of agency actions, if not the vast majority, falls within
this class. For example, a decision by a prosecutorial agency not to prosecute, a decision to respond or not to respond to certain correspondence, a
decision not to issue a declaratory ruling under § 84-912 and hosts of other
decisions of relatively low saliency would be in this class. Contrary to the
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and there is no provision for review of an agency's refusal to act.18 7
Consequently, many agency actions are not subject to judicial review under the Nebraska APA. This section, however, discusses
those sections of the Act which provide for judicial review.
Section 84-911 (1) provides for judicial review of agency rules:
The validity of any rule may be determined upon a petition for a declaratory judgment thereon addressed to the district court of Lancaster
County if it appears that the rule or its threatened application interferes
with or impairs or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or
privileges of the petitioner. The agency shall be made a party to the proceeding. The declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the
petitioner has first
requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the
188
rule in question.

This section is based on the 1961 Model Act,18 9 and in light of the
dearth of cases nationally' 9 0 and in Nebraska, 191 it has not been
problematic. The Nebraska Act adds to the Model Act by specifying the standard of review.19 2 The standard, recognizing the distinction between exercises of quasi-legislative power in rulemaking and exercises of quasi-judicial power in adjudications, provides a narrower scope of review than that provided for contested
193
case determinations.
Section 84-912 providds for judicial review of declaratory rulings
issued by agencies. Under this section, agencies, if petitioned by
an interested person, may issue declaratory rules that are binding
on the agency and the petitioners. The declaratory ruling is then
subject to judicial review in the same manner as a contested case.
The statute apparently vests the agency with the discretion to is-

187.

188.
189.
190.
191.

192.
193.

assertion of one commentator, see Note, supra note 185, at 1154 n.94, agency
action falling within the Nebraska APA's definitions of rule and contested
case comprise only a segment, albeit the most visible and publicized segment, of an agency's actions. See notes 80-89 & accompanying text supra.
See Comment, The Wyoming AdministrativeProcedureAct, 1 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 497, 511 (1966) (Wyoming administrative procedure act expands judicial review to encompass agency inaction and agency action which is neither
rule-making nor adjudication). See also Bloomenthal, supra note 48, at 62223.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-911(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 178, § 7, at 213.
13 UNnFORm LAws ANN. 399, 441-42 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
In the only reported Nebraska case interpreting the section, the supreme
court held that the granting of declaratory relief under § 84-911(1) is discretionary with the court. Millard School Dist. No. 17 v. State Dep't of Educ., 202
Neb. 707, 710-11, 277 N.W.2d 71, 73 (1979) (declaratory relief denied where petition presents a claim for money against the state and where declaratory judgment would not terminate controversy giving rise to proceeding).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-911 (Reissue 1976).
Compare NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-911(2) (Reissue 1976) with NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 84-917(6) (Reissue 1976). See Shell Oil Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd.,
37 Ill. App. 3d 264 346 N.E.2d 212 (1976).
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sue or refuse to issue such declaratory rulings. 194 If agency refusals to issue such rulings are not subject to judicial review (as
seems likely), 195 the viability of the section 84-912 review procedure is seriously undermined; agencies could easily avoid
such re196
view by simply refusing to issue declaratory rulings.
Section 84-917 is the major judicial review provision of the Nebraska APA. This section, in large part based on the 1946 Model
Act,197 provides for review of agency decisions in contested cases.
Generally, the section provides that "aggrieved" persons are entitled to judicial review of "final" agency decisions in contested
cases. 198 A single form of proceeding is prescribed' 99 and the
agency's action is reviewed on the basis of the record of the
agency.20 0 While appeal of an agency action does not automatically stay enforcement of the agency decision, section 84-917 allows
20
the entry of such a stay either by the agency itself or by a court. '
In addition, the section provides the applicable standard of review
202
for the reviewing court.
As noted above, any "aggrieved" person is entitled to judicial
review under section 84-917. In effect, this skeletal language imposes a standing requirement. 20 3 Although the language is not as
194. "[A] ny agency may issue a declaratory ruling ...
" NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-912
(Cum. Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
195. See Sonderling Broadcasting Corp. v. District of Columbia Minimum Wage &
Indust. Safety Bd., 315 A.2d 828 (D.C. 1974). But see Human Rights Party v.
Michigan Corrections Comm'n, 76 Mich. App. 204, 256 N.W.2d 439 (1977).
196. The 1961 Model Act avoids this problem by providing that "[r] ulings disposing of petitions" are subject to judicial review. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note
18, § 8, at 213. Presumably, this language, in contrast to the Nebraska APA
language which is based on the 1946 Act, see 1946 MODEL ACT, supra note 7,
§ 7, at 208, permits judicial review of an agency refusal to issue a declaratory
ruling. See Dakin, supra note 141, at 817.
197. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (Reissue 1976) with 1946 MODEL ACT,
supra note 2, § 12, at 213-14.
198. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(1) (Reissue 1976).
199. Id. § 84-917(2).
200. Id. § 84-917(5). See Happy Hour, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n,
186 Neb. 533, 534, 184 N.W.2d 630, 630-31 (1971).
201. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(3) (Reissue 1976).
202. Id. § 84-917(6). Section 84-918 provides for appeal from the district court to
the supreme court. Although the section appears to envision a de novo review by the supreme court, the supreme court has wisely interpreted it to
limit the scope of review to that governing the district court's decision, i.e., to
the standard provided by § 84-917(6). Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. v. Department of Banking & Fin., 206 Neb. 599, 600-01, 294 N.W.2d 343, 344 (1980);
Gosney v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 206 Neb. 137, 140, 291 N.W.2d 708, 71112 (1980); The 20's Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 190 Neb. 761, 764,
212 N.W.2d 344, 346 (1973).
203. See Comment, supra note 44, at 107.
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specific as it could be, 20 4 it is Model Act language that has been
delineated to a great extent by cases in other jurisdictions. 205 As
such, it probably fulfills its function of screening out frivolous or
unwarranted claims.
Even if a person has standing under the Act, only 'Tnal" agency
decisions are appealable. This statutory language imposes an obligation to exhaust administrative remedies, 206 and, as with the "aggrieved" person requirement, this language is not overly
specific. 20 7 Nevertheless, it does serve as a mechanism to avoid
'premature interruption of the administrative process. '208
The Nebraska APA prescribes a form of proceeding to obtain
20 9
judicial review of an agency's decision in a contested case.
Model acts, presumably including the Nebraska APA, provide a
form of proceeding in an attempt to avoid the technical procedural
problems associated with prerogative writs. 210 Although the
204. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 117-18.
205. See 13 UNnFORm LAWS ANN.399, 482-85 (Cum. Supp. 1980); McCrory, supra
note 9, at 17-19.
206. Cox, supra note 9, at 907.
207. See 1980 PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 118-19; 1961 MODEL AcT, supranote
18, § 15(a), at 220.
208. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). See also Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749 (1975).
209. The Act provides that review can be obtained by filing a petition in the district court of the county where the challenged agency action was taken within
thirty days of service of the agency's final decision. All the parties of record
must be made parties to the review proceedings and a summons must be
served on the agency. The court may permit intervenors. NEB. Rav. STAT.
§ 84-917(2) (Reissue 1976). Such a petition can result in affnimance, remand,
reversal or modification of the agency's decision. Id. § 84-917(6).
210. The prerogative writs, whether in common law or statutory form, present
many problems for the lawyer seeking review of agency action:
The common law remedies available are the equitable and the extraordinary legal remedies, which as applied by state courts are mutually exclusive. The determination of which method of review is
applicable is made on concepts of whether the agency action is judicial, nonjudicial, discretionary, or ministerial; and these concepts do
not lend themselves to accurate definition. A party is put to the task
of choosing which remedy is applicable to the decision appealed
from, and if he makes the wrong choice his appeal will fail. Certiorari
is the wrong method of reviewing nonjudicial action, mandamus will
not reach discretionary action, and since neither certiorari nor mandamus is good for an action which is both nonjudicial and discretionary; the remedy is equitable, so that concepts such as irreparable
injury are applicable even though such concepts would not affect certiorari or mandamus. The result of such a system may be that the
court becomes so taken with the technical procedural problems that
the appeal fails to reach the merit of the case.
Comment, supra note 187, at 515 n.133 (citations omitted). But the dangers of
the prerogative writs was not limited to courts becoming "taken" with them;
the plaintiff was forced to make a choice and if he chose wrong, his cause of
action could be doomed-
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Nebraska Act is a step towards the achievement of this objective, it
falls short. First, it provides different procedures for review of
rules and for review of determinations in contested cases. 211 Second, even with respect to review of contested case determinations,
2 12
it does not make the Act's form of proceeding exclusive.
In Nebraska, judicial review is based "on the record" of the
agency. 213 Obviously, the purpose of the provision is to require litigants to try their cases "fully and carefully before the administrative tribunal itself and not [to] use that body as a mere stepping
stone to the courts. '2 14 Nevertheless, certain exceptions to the
rule would be desirable. For example, the reviewing court should

211.

212.

213.
214.

[T] here was always the danger of discovering in an appellate court
that one had sued out the wrong prerogative writ, rendering it necessary to start over again, if indeed one had not lost his cause of action
by laches or through an intervening change of position. Thus, for example, one might have applied for and been granted certiorari only to
discover after argument and determination that he should have proceeded by way of ... mandamus, or vice versa....
Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 303, 70 A.2d 77, 79 (1949). See generally F. COOPER,
supra note 14, at 644-62.
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-911 (Reissue 1976) (procedure for review of
rules) with NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (Reisshe 1976) (procedure for review of
contested case determinations). This dichotomy "causes unnecessary
problems, particularly in the borderland between rule-making and adjudication." SCHWARTZ, AMIniSTRATVE LAW A CASEBOOK 637 (1977). See 1980
PROPOSED ACT, supra note 9, at 114; Bloomenthal, supra note 48, at 623-24.
The Nebraska APA explicitly provides that the Act's form of proceeding does
not prevent resort to other means of review provided by law, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 84-917(1) (Reissue 1976), see Weeks v. State Bd. of Educ., 204 Neb. 659, 66263, 284 N.W.2d 843, 845-46 (1979); Downer v. Ihms, 192 Neb. 594, 597-98, 223
N.W.2d 148, 150 (1974), and, indeed, provides that the Act's procedures do not
apply where "other provisions of law prescribe the method of appeal." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 84-917(7) (Reissue 1976). The lafter provision must be intended
to preserve judicial review procedures that have been tailored for specific
agencies. See, e.g. id. §§ 48-638 to -640 (Reissue 1978) (appeal procedures
from decisions of appeal tribunal under the Unemployment Compensation
Act); id. § 60-420 (Reissue 1978) (appeal procedure from certain decisions of
Director of Motor Vehicles). Cf., Scott v. Board of Nursing, 196 Neb. 681, 69192, 244 N.W.2d 683, 690 (1976) (appeal procedure from certain decisions of
Board of Nursing). Nebraska's preservation of various forms of proceeding
and concomitant refusal to make the Act's form of proceeding exclusive has
not been without its problems. See, e.g., Harrigfeld v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 203 Neb. 741, 280 N.W.2d 61 (1979). Contrast the Nebraska approach with that of Wisconsin. When Wisconsin adopted its administrative
procedure act, it specifically modified the sundry methods of review in seventy-odd separate statutes to provide that "[a] ny order of the board shall be
subject to review in the manner provided in [the administrative procedure
act] ." Hoyt, The Wisconsin Administrative ProcedureAct, 1944 Wis. L REV.
214, 229.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(5) (Reissue 1976). See Harnett v. City of Omaha, 188
Neb. 449, 451, 197 N.W.2d 375, 377 (1972).
Hoyt, supra note 212, at 234.
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be able to take additional evidence if the objection to the agency's
decision is that the agency harbored improper bias against the pe215
titioner or acted with an improper motive.
Finally, the Nebraska APA specifies the scope of judicial review
of agency action.2 16 The standards provided are general, but it is
important to recognize that standards with such broad applicability must be general and can only be made clear through elaboration and application by the courts. 2 17 Other than merely reciting
the statutory language, the courts in Nebraska have not construed
the standards to any great extent. 218 It should be noted, however,
that the Act's language appears to embrace the legal residuum
doctrine. Under that doctrine, despite the fact that the evidentiary
rules are eased, 219 an agency's determination is not substantially
supported, and hence cannot be upheld by a court, unless there is
at least a residuum of evidence supportive of the decision that is
competent under the exclusionary rules. For example, a determination could not be upheld if the only supportive evidence was
hearsay.2 20 The Nebraska APA requires the agency's decision to
be supported by "competent, material and substantial evidence. '2 21 The word "competent" arguably imports the legal resid215.
216.
217.
218.

See, e.g., 1980 PROPOSED AcT, supra note 9, § 5-114, at 124.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(6) (Reissue 1976).
Curran & Sacks, supra note 71, at 96.
See Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. v. Department of Banking & Fin., 206 Neb.
599, 601,294 N.W.2d 343, 344 (1980); Box Butte County v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 206 Neb. 696, 709, 295 N.W.2d 670, 679 (1980); The 20's Inc. v.
Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 190 Neb. 761, 212 N.W.2d 344 (1973). See
generally Gosney v. Department of Public Welfare, 206 Neb. 137, 146-47, 291
N.W.2d 708, 711-12 (1980); American Motor Sales Corp. v. Perkins, 198 Neb. 97,
251 N.W.2d 727 (1977). Despite the relative dearth of authority, the statutory
standard of review in the Nebraska APA does not appear to differ significantly from the standard of review in error proceedings, see Davis v. Board of
Educ., 203 Neb. 1, 277 N.W.2d 414 (1979) (administrative decision in error proceeding must be supported by "sufficient evidence"); Stradley v. City of
Omaha, 201 Neb. 378, 381, 267 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1978) (administrative decision
in error proceeding affirmed if agency acted within its jurisdiction and competent evidence supports findings and order), or from the standard of review
under other statutes. See Herink v. State Real Estate Comm'n, 198 Neb. 241,
252 N.W.2d 172 (1977) (order of Nebraska State Real Estate Commission upheld if supported by substantial evidence, within scope of Commission's authority and not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable); Hartman v. Glenwood
Tel. Membership Corp., 197 Neb. 359, 372-73, 249 N.W.2d 468, 476 (1977) (order
of Public Service Commission upheld if Commission acted within scope of its
authority, its order is reasonable and not arbitrary, and there is evidence to
support findings).
219. See notes 140-43 & accompanying text supra.
220. See, e.g., Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.H. 5, 462 A.2d 139 (1969); Carroll v.
Knicherbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
221. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-917(6) (e) (Reissue 1976) (emphasis added).
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uum doctrine, 222 a result that is probably unfortunate. 223
III.

CONCLUSION

This analysis of the Nebraska APA demonstrates that the Act is
seriously deficient in several aspects. Clearly, this is the time for
legislative change. While the change should not be merely another
piecemeal attempt to patch the Act's most glaring deficiencies,
neither should the legislature adopt the 1980 Proposed Act in toto
without critical consideration. Change in this area affects virtually
every state agency and, therefore, has an enormous disruptive potential. The legislature should consider the current Act and the
procedures it establishes and review the 1961 Model Act and the
1980 Proposed Act for approaches that are adaptable to Nebraska's
peculiarities. It should tailor an Act that, hopefully, best effectuates the goals of a uniform administrative procedure act while minimizing to the greatest extent possible the cost-producing
disruption to settled agency practices and expectations. In addition, although this article has focused on the legislative shortcomings of the Act, increased awareness of the Act's potential by the
legal community as a whole, and specifically practicing attorneys,
is important. The Nebraska APA is a valuable tool that is all too
often overlooked. 224 To the extent the Act is increasingly utilized
as a tool, clients can be better served and, of equal importance, the
Act can be refined to better effectuate the admirable policies that
resulted in its initial enactment thirty-six years ago.

222.
223.

See Midwest L.C. Co. v. Tri-State L.C. Co., 182 Neb. 41, 47, 151 N.W.2d 908, 913
(1967). See also F. COOPER, s-upra note 14, at 732-33.
One cannot help wondering, however, whether the legislatures really
meant to produce a hybrid situation in which commissions could
freely hear all the incompetent evidence they pleased, but could
make no legal use of it--especially since the avowed object of the
provision, that of escaping the bickerings which had so long discredited the rules of evidence in common law trials, would thereby be
thwarted; for the same old quarrels would be staged, the only difference being that they would be fought in the name of probative-valueto-support-awards rather than in the name of admissibility.

2 LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 79-30 (1975).
224. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. County of Lancaster, 154 Neb. 398,48 N.W.2d 221
(1975). In Board of Regents, Lancaster County challenged a rule promulgated by the Board of Regents. While the rule was upheld, the County never
made the Nebraska APA argument available to it, specifically, that the rule
was invalid because it had not been filed as required by the Act.

